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ECONOMISTS AS ARBITRATORS
J. Gregory Sidak*
ABSTRACT
Whenever a claimant in arbitration prevails, the tribunal must calculate
quantum. Indeed, sometimes the central question in arbitration is to value a
disputed asset. However, an arbitrator’s expertise typically is law, not
economics. How can the tribunal apply economic analysis to the question of
quantum with the same intellectual rigor that it has applied legal analysis to
the anterior questions of jurisdiction, liability, defenses, and the like? One way
is to appoint an economist as one of the arbitrators. A second way is for the
tribunal to appoint its own neutral economic expert. Either approach would
expedite the arbitration by causing parties to submit more realistic estimates of
quantum and to explain in a more systematic and helpful manner the
robustness of those estimates and the assumptions underlying them.
INTRODUCTION
An arbitral tribunal must calculate quantum anytime a claimant prevails.
Indeed, sometimes the central question in arbitration is how to value a disputed
asset. However, an arbitrator’s expertise typically is law, not economics. How
can the tribunal apply economic analysis to the question of quantum with the
same intellectual rigor that the tribunal has applied legal analysis to the
anterior questions of jurisdiction, liability, defenses, and the like?1 One way is
to appoint an economist as one of the arbitrators. A second way is for the
tribunal to appoint its own neutral economic expert. Either approach would
expedite the arbitration by causing parties to submit more realistic estimates of
quantum and to explain in a more systematic and helpful manner the
robustness of those estimates and the assumptions underlying them.

*

Chairman, Criterion Economics, L.L.C., Washington, D.C. Email: jgsidak@criterioneconomics.com. I
thank Hernando Diaz-Candia, James Flynn, Martin Hunter, Gustaf Möller, Philippe Sands, Joshua Simmons,
and Robert Volterra for helpful comments. The views expressed are solely my own.
1 The answer to this question is broader in scope than the subject of this Essay. For an insightful attempt
to provide the broader answer with respect to investor-state disputes, see Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in
Investor-State Arbitration: Toward A More Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 196 (2012).
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In this Essay, I examine the use of economists as arbitrators or tribunalappointed neutral experts in international arbitration. I analyze how either
approach can raise the standard of intellectual rigor in party-expert testimony
and expedite the determination of quantum. I draw insights from my
experience as a court-appointed neutral economic expert on damages for Judge
Richard Posner under Rule 706 of the United States (U.S.) Federal Rules of
Evidence in two patent litigations between 2012 and 2014—Brandeis
University v. East Side Ovens, Inc.,2 and Northgate Technologies, Inc. v.
Stryker Corp.3 I have elsewhere written about my experience both serving as
Judge Posner’s neutral economic expert and my recommendations on how to
make the best use of a neutral economic expert in American litigation.4 Both
cases show how a neutral economic expert’s involvement in a dispute can
create an incentive for parties to present more plausible damages estimates and
thus narrow the bid-ask spread between their respective estimates of quantum.
In Part I, I explain that calculating damages inherently requires economic
analysis, which, in my experience, is often absent from much accounting-based
expert testimony. The rules of prominent arbitration institutions require an
expert to be independent and impartial to safeguard a tribunal’s access to the
expertise it needs to render an award. In this way, these institutions further
differentiate their proceedings from traditional litigation, making those
proceedings more valuable in cases requiring complex analysis of business
disputes.
In Part II, I explain why economic expertise in the arbitral tribunal is
desirable. Justice Stephen Breyer and Judge Posner have identified a similar
need for neutral expertise in litigation in the United States. In Part III, I explain
that both the selection of an arbitrator with economic expertise and the
tribunal’s appointment of a neutral economic expert would create greater
benefits than costs for the parties to the arbitration.

2 Order ¶ 5, Brandeis Univ. v. East Side Ovens, Inc., Nos. 1:12-cv-01508–1:12-cv-01513 (W.D. Ill.
Mar. 16, 2012) (order appointing Gregory Sidak as expert on damages).
3 See generally Complaint, Northgate Techs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 958 (N.D. Ill. 2014);
Curriculum
Vitae
of
J.
Gregory
Sidak,
Criterion
Economics,
LLC,
https://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/gregory-sidak-curriculum-vitae.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
4 J. Gregory Sidak, Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 359, 359
(2013) [hereinafter Sidak, Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts].
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I. USING IMPARTIAL ECONOMIC EXPERTISE TO PRODUCE MORE
INTELLECTUALLY RIGOROUS ESTIMATES OF QUANTUM
Investor-state arbitration or international commercial arbitration typically
requires each party to estimate damages. Given that the calculation of damages
is inherently an economic endeavor, tribunals need economic expertise to reach
an intellectually rigorous finding of the magnitude of quantum.
A. The Unique Contribution of Economic Expertise
In international arbitration, the claimant bears the burden of proving that it
has suffered harm, what the quantum of damages is, and the causal connection
between the respondent’s conduct and the damages claimed.5 The tribunal may
not accept the claimant’s damages estimate if the tribunal considers it to be
based on insufficient evidence. It may be difficult for the claimant to prove its
damage claim without economic expert testimony.6
Computation of damages in both arbitration and litigation typically relies
on but-for analysis. The methodology asks what the claimant’s revenue (or
costs) would have been but for the harm-causing act or omission. The arbitral
award should compensate for all consequences of the harmful act or omission
as if it had not occurred.7 In other words, the award must equal the economic
difference between the claimant’s financial situation in the real world and in
the but-for world.8 An important aspect of this task is to disaggregate and
remove the impact of industry and macroeconomic changes—what economists
call “exogenous” factors. To project the value of a business, one must thus
5 See INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 7.4.3 (2010) (“Harm must be a direct consequence of non-performance as well
as certain.”) [hereinafter UNIDROIT PICC]. See generally HERFRIED WÖSS, ADRIANA SAN ROMÁN RIVERA,
PABLO T. SPILLER & SANTIAGO DELLEPIANE, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION UNDER COMPLEX
LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 78–184 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2014).
6 Cf. R. Wisner, J. W. William Rowley & A. N. Campbell, Effective Use of Economic Expertise in
International Arbitration: Counsel’s Role and Perspective, in 1 EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION:
A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 240, ¶ 8-007 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 2011) (“Expert
evidence relating to the quantification of damages arising from breaches of contract may involve the
application of economic principles . . . .”).
7 Id.; see, e.g., UNIDROIT PICC, supra note 5, art. 7.4.2 (“The aggrieved party is entitled to full
compensation for harm sustained as a result of non-performance. Such harm includes both any loss which it
suffered and any gain of which it was deprived . . . .”); see also 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 100–01
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (explaining that the standard remedy for breach of contract
is expectation damages, which put the injured party in “as good a position as he would have been in if the
contract had been performed”).
8 WÖSS ET AL., supra note 5, at 256, ¶ 6.26.
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apply economic principles and methods to the facts and data of the dispute to
determine the conditions of the but-for world.
It is essential to understand the fundamental methodological difference
between expert testimony that rests on accounting conventions and expert
testimony that rests on economic reasoning. Accounting and economics are not
substitutes for one another. They are different fields that are complementary to
one another. As Nobel laureate Ronald Coase explained decades ago,
“accounting records merely disclose figures relating to past operations.”9
Accounting analysis is, in essence, backward-looking. The focus of accounting
is to track stocks and flows of assets and liabilities. When examining the
actions of a firm in a commercial dispute, accounting conventions can be
useful for categorizing the facts as they are. Accounting enables a firm or
outside auditor to track a firm’s financial health or its position within an
industry, relative to similar firms. However, accounting does not reveal
anything about causal relationships among the variables it tracks.
Economic analysis, in contrast, can provide intellectually rigorous
estimations of a rational party’s behavior in the but-for world. Economics
enables one to investigate the relevant incentives and opportunities that a firm
faces when determining its strategic decisions. Economics also enables one to
formulate testable hypotheses and subject them to empirical methods that will
allow one to accept or reject those hypotheses.10 In formulating those
hypotheses, economics relies on an established body of scientific knowledge—
most notably, price theory. Although accounting methods provide only the
facts about which products consumers have purchased, economics can predict
changes in consumer behavior in response to a change in consumer
preferences, incomes, prices of complements or substitutes, or other factors
relevant to consumer demand.
Furthermore, economic profits—not accounting profits—drive a firm’s
decision making. The scholarly literature on antitrust, for example, has long
rejected the use of accounting data as a tool to evaluate a company’s market
power. There are considerable differences between accounting profit and
economic profit. “Accounting profit is the difference between a firm’s

9 R. H. Coase, Business Organization and the Accountant (1938), reprinted in L.S.E. ESSAYS ON COST
100 (J.M. Buchanan & G.F. Thirlby eds., 1981).
10 See generally KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 13–17
(James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1979).
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revenues and its operating expenses (or explicit costs),”11 whereas “[e]conomic
profit is the difference between a firm’s revenues, operating expenses, and the
opportunity cost of the inputs used to make the firm’s sales.”12 Business
decisions depend on estimates of the future.13 Given that valuation analysis
inherently requires forward-looking projections from the time of the harmful
act or omission, one necessarily needs to use economic tools to project the
value of a business.14
The benefit from economic expertise in arbitration is evident in valuing
property damages. To value tangible property, an economic expert can apply
the principle of demand substitution.15 Considering that a firm would typically
try to minimize its costs, how easily can a firm find a substitute for a piece of
tangible property if the price of that property were to increase? How much
would the firm pay to replace or reproduce the property? Valuing intangible
property is more challenging. An intangible asset—for example, a promising
technology—is usually not sold separately from the overall business.16 On an
accounting-based balance sheet, the intellectual property rights are often
recorded at their acquisition cost. Even if the asset “continue[s] to have
significant market value,” it is depreciated over its finite useful life.17 At the
end of its useful life, the value of an asset will be recorded as zero on a balance
sheet.18 The valuation of property, and intangible property in particular, may
require an economist to combine different valuation techniques.

11 Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, The Misuse of Profit Margins to Infer Market Power, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 511, 514 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
12 Id. (emphasis in original); cf. William W. Park, Keynote Address at the Institute for Transnational
Arbitration: Framing the Case on Quantum, in 2 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 59, 62 (2008) (“If an
arbitral tribunal awards me only the cost of the pots and the pans, the chairs and the tables, that is clearly not
the true value of the restaurant.”).
13 See Coase, supra note 9, at 99.
14 Wisner, Rowley & Campbell, supra note 6, at 240, § 2.B.2.8-008 (“[I]n some cases, issues arise
relating to the need to calculate market prices, sales, or costs under future or hypothetical market conditions
with a view to ascertaining the victim’s future economic loss. Here, economists can be good substitutes for or
complements to the accountants and business valuators that counsel usually rely upon to quantify damages.”).
15 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 324–25 (1st ed. 1993).
16 See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 898 (9th ed. 2008) (“A
Corporation may be paying for an intangible asset that is not listed on B Corporation’s balance sheet. . . .
[T]he intangible asset may be a promising product or technology.”) (emphasis in original).
17 MARK KANTOR, VALUATION FOR ARBITRATION: COMPENSATION STANDARDS, VALUATION METHODS
AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 239 (2008).
18 Id.

SIDAK GALLEYSFINAL

2110

3/23/2016 12:01 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Furthermore, through technological innovation the firm in question may
have created an entirely new market.19 Internet and mobile technology
companies are examples in that they lack rich historical data because they are
new. Moreover, historical data may shed no light on the value of products or
business opportunities in an industry subject to rapid technological change.
Such a new market may not be covered extensively in the existing laws,
institutional rules, or literature on international arbitration. An economist can
help the tribunal value the innovative service or product.
B. Independence, Impartiality, and Intellectual Rigor
The use of experts in international arbitration is growing.20 In February
2015, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) replaced its 2003 ICC
Rules for Expertise with a three-part set of rules on experts and neutrals.21 The
new rules implicitly acknowledge the growing demand for independent and
impartial experts in dispute resolution.
Today, party-appointed experts in international arbitration are explicitly
obligated by the rules of the leading arbitration organizations to be
independent, and sometimes also impartial in assisting the tribunal, to preserve
the tribunal’s access to a reliable source of expertise.22 For example, the ICC’s
2003 Expert Rules required only the party expert’s independence,23 but the
2015 ICC Expert Rules also require impartiality for party experts.24 Various
19 See generally J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581 (2009).
20 See, e.g., Giovanni De Berti, Experts and Expert Witnesses in International Arbitration: Adviser,
Advocate or Adjudicator?, AUSTRIAN Y.B. ON INT’L ARB. 53, 53–54 (2011).
21 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EXPERT RULES 1 (2015) [hereinafter ICC EXPERT RULES]; see also
New ICC Expert Rules Come into Force, INT’L CHAMBER COM. (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2015/New-ICC-Expert-Rules-come-into-force/.
22 See, e.g., LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, LCIA ARBITRATION RULES art. 21.2 (2014)
[hereinafter LCIA RULES]; INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION art. 5 (2010) [hereinafter IBA RULES]; CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, PROTOCOL FOR THE
USE OF PARTY-APPOINTED EXPERTS IN ARBITRATION art. 4(1) (2007); see also GARY B. BORN, 2
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 15.08[AA], at 2280 (2d ed. 2014); Dushyant Dave, Should
Experts Be Neutrals or Advocates?, in ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES 149, 151 (Albert Jan
van den Berg ed., 2011); Mark Kantor, A Code of Conduct for Party-Appointed Experts in International
Arbitration—Can One Be Found?, 26 ARB. INT’L 323, 323–24 (2010).
23 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EXPERTISE RULES arts. 7(3), 11(1) (2003).
24 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EXPERT RULES: PROPOSAL OF EXPERTS AND NEUTRALS art. 2(3)
(2015) [hereinafter ICC PROPOSAL RULES]; INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EXPERT RULES: APPOINTMENT OF
EXPERTS AND NEUTRALS art. 3(3) (2015) [hereinafter ICC APPOINTMENT RULES]; INT’L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, EXPERT RULES: ADMINISTRATION OF EXPERT PROCEEDINGS art. 4(1) (2015) [hereinafter ICC
ADMINISTRATION RULES].
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rules on the use of expert testimony require the testifying expert to declare
independence and impartiality and disclose any facts and circumstances that
may compromise the expert’s independence.25 It is notable that international
arbitration thus imposes a higher duty on party experts than does U.S.
litigation, which does not expressly require (through the Federal Rules of
Evidence, for example) an expert to represent that his report and oral testimony
are independent and impartial. This higher duty of party experts in arbitration
is one way that arbitration organizations can seek to differentiate arbitration as
superior to U.S. litigation as a method of dispute resolution. Of course, another
differentiating characteristic of arbitration is that the parties can select
arbitrators having greater economic competence.
II. ECONOMIC EXPERTISE IN THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
An arbitrator with economic expertise would alter the incentive of parties
to produce a more realistic quantum estimate. Justice Breyer and Judge Posner
both call for a neutral source of expertise to aid judges in U.S. litigation,
reflecting the practical importance of relevant and reliable expertise in
evaluating scientific evidence.
A. The Benefits of an Arbitrator with Economic Expertise
Each party has an incentive to present a favorable damages estimate. That
estimate could be extremely low for a respondent and extremely high for a
claimant. The presence of an economist on a tribunal would hold the party
economic experts to a higher standard of economic rigor—in effect, giving
substantive content to the arbitral requirement that each party expert be
independent and impartial. The economist-arbitrator would thereby create an
incentive for the opposing parties to generate more plausible, and less
polarized, damages estimates. By narrowing the gap between parties’ quantum
estimates, an economic expert on a tribunal would simplify the tribunal’s
deliberation on quantum and expedite its ultimate findings of fact on the
question.
If, in contrast, the tribunal lacks economic expertise, then error and bias in
the economic testimony of the party experts will be harder to detect and
25 See, e.g., ICC PROPOSAL RULES, supra note 24, art. 2(3); ICC APPOINTMENT RULES, supra note 24,
art. 3(3); ICC ADMINISTRATION RULES, supra note 24, art. 4(2); IBA RULES, supra note 22, art. 5(2)(c); see
also Doug Jones, Party Appointed Expert Witnesses in International Arbitration: A Protocol at Last, 24 ARB.
INT’L 137, 138–39 (2008).
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evaluate. In his impressive critique of valuation in investor-state arbitration,
Joshua Simmons observed:
In most modern investor-state arbitration proceedings, the complexity
of valuation is beyond the traditional legal training of arbitrators.
Nearly all arbitrators in investor-state proceedings hail from legal
backgrounds, whether in private practice, government, or academia.
A survey of the publicly available biographies of leading arbitrators
reveals that none of those arbitrators [has] post-graduate degrees in
the fields of finance, economics, or mathematics. Because of their
backgrounds, arbitrators may be reluctant to immerse themselves in
the detailed formulas and spreadsheets submitted by the parties.
Legal training and analysis do not align well with the task of
assessing fair market value. Even if arbitrators were fully able to
acquire the necessary financial competency, they could not overcome
26
the fact that they are neither economists nor financial analysts.

Even if the tribunal recognizes an implausible damages estimate, outright
exclusion of the testimony of the expert witness in question is rare in practice
because arbitrators are careful to safeguard the parties’ right to be heard.27
Appointing an economist as an arbitrator not only would improve the quality
of damages testimony, but also would enable the tribunal to evaluate the
opposing economic testimony of the party experts more quickly and reliably.28
The typical criteria for an arbitrator include commercial, technical, and
legal competence, along with linguistic abilities, experience in international
arbitration, and (sometimes) a particular nationality.29 Obtaining such a breadth
of qualifications and expertise in economic analysis in a sole or presiding
arbitrator may be desirable but difficult to achieve. The added qualification in
economics might deter the parties from agreeing on an arbitrator appointee. If
26

Simmons, supra note 1, at 209 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., BORN, supra note 22, § 15.08[AA], at 2279, 2281.
28 See Mike Walker, The Use of Economic Evidence in Competition Law Arbitrations, in EU AND US
ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 213–14 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds.,
2011) (“[M]ost arbitrators are not economists and do not have experience in working with economists. This
naturally means that the use of complex economics in a competition law arbitration runs the risk that the
decision maker is unable to appraise the evidence properly.”); see also William W. Park, Arbitrators and
Accuracy, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 25, 25 (2010) (“An arbitrator’s primary duty remains the delivery of
an accurate award, resting on a reasonably ascertainable picture of reality.”) [hereinafter Park, Arbitrators and
Accuracy].
29 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR ADMITTANCE TO THE AAA
NATIONAL ROSTER OF ARBITRATORS 1 (2011) (stating that qualification includes a minimum of ten years of
senior-level business or professional experience or legal practice, as well as a relevant educational degree or
professional licenses); BORN, supra note 22, § 12.03, at 1679.
27
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the parties decide to appoint an arbitral panel,30 they may wish to consider
including an economist.31
ho would appoint the economist arbitrator (assuming that the parties still
desire lawyers to be on the panel)? In many sets of arbitration rules, where
there are to be three arbitrators, each party appoints one arbitrator and both
appoint a chairman (or the institution does if the two arbitrators cannot agree).
In such circumstances, is it more or less likely that an economist would be
appointed as one of the three? Although the answer might differ if the rules
provided for the parties or the institution to ensure a balanced composition of
the panel, tailored to the issues that the tribunal must determine, one can
imagine several possible outcomes.
For example, the first possibility is that one party selects an economist and
the opposing party does not, and the two arbitrators then select a lawyer to be
president of the tribunal. If the economist lacks understanding of the intricacies
of the legal process, the other two members of the tribunal might derive little
benefit from the economist’s participation in the early stages of the arbitration.
If and when the matter proceeds to the merits, the economist will have a
greater likelihood of complementing the experience and perspectives of the
other arbitrators and, therefore, potentially influencing the arbitration’s
outcome. Recognizing that possibility, counsel for the party that did not select
the economist as an arbitrator could be expected to adjust its strategy
accordingly—for example, by emphasizing jurisdictional objections of a highly
technical nature, which would be outside the economist’s area of comparative
advantage, such that opposing counsel would tend to neutralize the
economist’s role on the tribunal.
A second possibility is that both parties appoint economists, who then
appoint a lawyer to serve as president of the tribunal. However, this outcome
seems unlikely, as it would tilt the tribunal decidedly away from having its
principal expertise in law.

30 The ICC, LCIA, and American Arbitration Association (AAA) commercial rules presume a sole
arbitrator and allow the appointment of three arbitrators in appropriate cases. The UNCITRAL rules uniquely
require a three-personal panel. See BORN, supra note 22, § 12.03[D], at 1708–12.
31 In one International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitration, the Republic of
Bolivia in fact appointed an economist as its pick on a three-member tribunal. See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v.
Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (2005),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/02/3.
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A third possibility is that both parties appoint lawyers as arbitrators, who
then appoint the economist as the president. This approach might work,
although the economist might become the deciding vote on legal questions for
which he lacks the requisite training in law. If the economist arbitrator also has
training as a lawyer, the tribunal might not need to sacrifice expertise on
questions of law or face the uncertainty that a non-lawyer might have the tiebreaking vote on the tribunal’s decisions of law.
B. The Recommendations of Justice Breyer and Judge Posner That Judges
Use Neutral Experts in U.S. Litigation
In the United States, Justice Breyer and Judge Posner recommend the use
of neutral experts to provide judges with relevant and reliable expertise in
areas where the judges’ expertise is lacking. For an expert’s evidence to meet
the Daubert standard for admissibility in the United States, a judge is required
to determine that the expert’s testimony “is not only relevant, but reliable.”32 In
a 1997 decision, Justice Breyer explained that a trial judge may not have the
relevant training to rule on the admissibility of certain testimony or evidence,
and he suggested appointing a neutral expert under Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.33 Judge Posner has also written about the trial court’s need
for its own expert with relevant expertise in a complex litigation. In one case,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the class action lawsuit based on
the finding that the plaintiffs’ expert presented flawed survey evidence.34 Judge
Posner recommended that district judges “consider exercising the clearly
authorized but rarely exercised option of appointing their own expert to
conduct a survey” in an effort “to improve judicial understanding of survey
methodology.”35
Appointing an expert who works at the intersection of law and economics
as an arbitrator could be another means to address the need that Justice Breyer
and Judge Posner identify. A separate question, however, is whether an
arbitrator with economic expertise would have as much availability as a
dedicated economic expert to analyze in depth the economic questions in a
complex dispute. When he sits by designation as the trial judge in patent
litigation, Judge Posner appoints a neutral scientific expert on liability
32

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997).
34 DeKoven v. Plaza Associates, 599 F.3d 578, 580–82 (7th Cir. 2010).
35 Id. at 583. For an international perspective, see generally Daniel Pleat, The Use of Court-Appointed
Experts by the International Court of Justice, 84 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 271 (2014).
33
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questions and a neutral economic expert on damages. It is instructive that even
Judge Posner—who has voluminously published on the application of
economics to legal questions, including remedies36—still finds it advantageous
to appoint a neutral economic expert.
Of course, unlike the U.S. adversarial system, which relies on party experts
to promote fact-finding and the jury to decide questions of fact, international
arbitration relies heavily on the tribunal to conduct fact-finding and deliver a
decision.37 Because an arbitrator tends to act as judge and jury, often for many
cases at once, the arbitrator would benefit from the specialization of function
that a neutral economic expert could offer.
III. ECONOMIC EXPERTISE IN A TRIBUNAL-APPOINTED EXPERT
A neutral economic expert can narrow the bid-ask spread between the
claimant and respondent on the matter of quantum and thereby simplify the
tribunal’s analysis of each party’s estimate. In contrast to the tribunal, the
neutral economic expert can devote his full attention to scrutinizing the
damages estimates and (unlike an economist serving as an arbitrator)
presumably will be subject to cross-examination by both parties. The mere
presence of a dedicated neutral economic expert would create an incentive for
the party experts to conduct a more rigorous economic analysis. A party expert
would have an even greater incentive to present only the most accurate and
plausible estimates of quantum.38 In this way, the neutral economic expert can
help the tribunal to avoid or mitigate an uninformative “battle of the experts.”
A. The Tribunal’s Ability to Appoint a Neutral (Economic) Expert
The use of neutral economic experts in arbitration has been limited, even
though several of the most prominent arbitration institutions expressly permit
the appointment of a neutral expert.39 Arbitration rules under the United
36

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010).
WÖSS ET AL., supra note 5, at 230, ¶ 5.157; Klaus Sachs & Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts, Protocol on Expert
Teaming: A New Approach to Expert Evidence, in ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES 135, 136
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2011); Dave, supra note 22, at 150; Wisner, Rowley & Campbell, supra note 6,
at 245, § 2.B.2.8-036.
38 Sidak, Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts, supra note 4, at 390–91.
39 See, e.g., ICC PROPOSAL RULES, supra note 24, art. 1; INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ICDR
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 22 (2009); LCIA RULES, supra note 22, art. 21; UNITED NATIONS
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULE (AS REVISED IN 2010) art. 29 (2010)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES]; Simmons, supra note 1, at 233 (“Arbitrators could enhance the legitimacy of
valuation in investor-state arbitration through . . . more frequent appointments of independent valuation
37
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Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the ICC, the London
Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and the International Bar
Association (IBA) Rules on Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration,
for example, explicitly permit the tribunal to appoint experts unless parties
mutually agree otherwise. National arbitration law may also enable the tribunal
to appoint an expert. For example, domestic law in ninety-seven jurisdictions,
including the United States and the United Kingdom, has adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which
enables a tribunal to appoint an expert.40 Arbitral rules do not limit the
circumstances in which a tribunal can appoint a neutral expert, but parties often
have the right to object either to the appointment of a neutral expert in general
or to the appointment of a specific candidate.41 Arbitration rules are, however,
largely silent on what expertise or background a tribunal-appointed expert
must possess. Certainly, expertise in economics relevant to calculating
quantum would be unobjectionable.
B. A Neutral Economist’s Ability to Expedite the Arbitration and Control Its
Costs
In addition to narrowing the spread of the parties’ estimates of quantum,
the neutral economic expert can aid the tribunal in deciding whether the
evidence on quantum rests on reliable economic methods and principles
properly applied to the facts and data of the case. Wöss et al. note,
“[s]pecialized knowledge of the economic expert is necessary for the
application of the law by the arbitral tribunal where ‘the law adopts an
explicitly economic criterion of legality’ such as in the case of the valuation of
experts. . . . Most investment treaties and arbitral rule systems give tribunals broad discretion to . . . enlist
tribunal-appointed experts. Parties . . . are not likely to oppose a tribunal’s appointment of an expert. Indeed,
particularly in high-stakes cases, parties may welcome the involvement of such experts, who would likely
contribute to financially sound, well explained, and thus legitimate valuations.”).
40 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), With Amendments as
Adopted
in
2006,
UNITED
NATIONS
COMMISSION
ON
INT’L
TRADE
L.,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2016) (“Legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted in 72 States in a total of 102
jurisdictions.”).
41 ICC APPOINTMENT RULES, supra note 24, art. 3(5); UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 39, art. 29. Some
arbitral rules, such as the LCIA 2014 Arbitration Rules, instruct the tribunal to “consult[] . . . the parties” to
appoint an expert. LCIA RULES, supra note 22, art. 21. Others, such as the ICC Expert Rules and the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (revised in 2010), state a formal process in which the parties can submit a
written objection to the tribunal, which a tribunal can accept or reject. ICC APPOINTMENT RULES, supra note
24, art. 3(5); UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 39, art. 29(2).
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damages.”42 The neutral economic expert’s ability to close the spread between
the damage estimates of the opposing party experts enables the tribunal to
isolate the disputed factual issues that are legally relevant to the outcome of the
arbitration. The marginal cost of using a neutral economic expert to perform
this function is surely low relative to either (1) the total cost of the arbitration
or (2) other (arguably less efficacious) procedures for eliciting this
information—such as cross-examination of the party experts or “hot tubbing”
sessions in which the opposing party experts answer the tribunal’s questions
concurrently.43
The tribunal can appoint a neutral economic expert very early in the
arbitration, and it is essential that the tribunal take advantage of that option. A
tribunal’s early appointment of a neutral economic expert signals to the parties
the type of expert they should employ and the level of intellectual rigor on
economic questions that the tribunal expects from the party experts. The
tribunal can thereby indirectly influence the parties’ selection of their own
experts. If, instead, the tribunal appoints a neutral economic expert late in the
arbitration, each party might fight to nominate a neutral economic expert who
more resembles its own (already-selected) party expert. A tribunal’s early
appointment also permits the neutral economic expert to confer with the parties
and their experts about the guidelines for the economic evidence to be
presented in the case.44 Those guidelines would set the minimum standard that
the testimony must meet on matters such as the expert’s assumptions used; his
efforts to ensure independent verification of the reliability of facts received
from counsel, the party retaining the expert, or third parties; the reasons for not
undertaking particular kinds of empirical analysis relating to essential
questions pertaining to liability or damages; and the methods used to test the
robustness of the expert’s findings, including the results of such testing. Such
guidelines would greatly reduce the subsequent cost to the parties and the
tribunal of making, opposing, and assessing the economic testimony of the
party experts. The party experts would prepare their reports in a manner that
would make it easier for the tribunal and the neutral economic expert to
compare and evaluate the competing findings.

42

WÖSS ET AL., supra note 5, at 230, ¶ 5.156 (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the
Economic Expert Witness, 13 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 91).
43 See Frances P. Kao et al., Into the Hot Tub . . . A Practical Guide to Alternative Expert Witness
Procedures in International Arbitration, 44 INT’L LAW. 1035, 1037 (2010).
44 Cf. ICC COMMISSION ON ARBITRATION AND ADR, CONTROLLING TIME AND COST IN ARBITRATION 13,
§ 67 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter ICC REPORT].
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Early appointment of a neutral economic expert might not always be
advisable. If the dispute concerns not only quantum but also liability, the
tribunal might opt not to appoint an expert until it decides questions of
liability. If the tribunal has bifurcated damages and liability, then it should
appoint a neutral economic expert if and when it finds the respondent liable.
However, if the tribunal does not bifurcate the proceedings early in the
arbitration, the parties will have submitted their own economic experts’
opinions before the tribunal has decided questions of liability and appointed
the neutral expert. Thus, in the absence of bifurcation, the tribunal should
appoint a neutral expert as early in the process as possible.
The tribunal can instruct the neutral economic expert to evaluate, for each
economic report from a party expert, the justification given for the expert’s
choice of valuation method, the size of valuation model inputs (such as the
choice of the particular discount rate, weighted-average cost of capital,
exchange rate, depreciation rate, and the like), and the relative weights that the
party expert has assigned to different causal factors. This exercise will
facilitate the tribunal’s apples-to-apples comparison and ultimate assessment of
the opposing expert reports. Typically, any projection of lost profits will
require making assumptions about future demand for and supply of the
claimant’s product in the but-for world. That exercise cannot rest on mere
assumptions about growth in demand or the extent of entry or expansion of
supply by competitors (which, in my experience, one far too often observes in
accounting-based estimates of damages). Rather, to be intellectually rigorous,
expert testimony on damages must base such projections on analysis of the
price elasticities of demand and supply, using actual empirical estimates when
they are available or readily ascertainable. That is to say, for testimony on
quantum in arbitration to rise to the level of reliable expert testimony, it should
be predicated on a scientific methodology that uses established principles
(typically from price theory, industrial organization, and finance). That
methodology should employ, when data are available, established methods of
econometric estimation to test empirically the expert’s hypotheses about causal
relationships influencing compensable harm and to measure the magnitude of
predicted differences between the observed world and the but-for world. This
level of rigor is typical in any high-stakes antitrust, securities, or patent
litigation in federal district court in New York, Chicago, or San Francisco. An
international arbitration organization does not favorably differentiate itself as
an alternative forum for resolving complex business disputes if it tolerates a
lesser degree of economic rigor from expert witnesses, or if the tribunal fails to
properly resolve the differences between the two sides on such issues.
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The tribunal might discover that the most efficacious use of a neutral
economic expert is at the hearing. In its discretion, the tribunal might instruct
the neutral economic expert to give direct testimony at the hearing, to submit
to cross-examination, or even to cross-examine the party experts. By way of
illustration, Judge Posner’s detailed order instructed me, as the court-appointed
neutral expert on damages in Northgate, to “sit for a deposition on May 6,
2014, to last no more than 4 hours, split equally, with two hours allotted to the
plaintiffs and defendants.”45 The instructions permitted (but did not compel)
me to “attend the depositions of the parties’ expert witnesses on damages” and
to “question each party expert for up to 30 minutes.”46 The order specified that
“[a]ny time you spend questioning a witness will be subtracted equally from
the plaintiff and defendants, up to a maximum of 15 minutes per side.” 47
Alternatively, Judge Posner permitted me to “email a reasonable number of
questions to the party experts on damages.”48 Judge Posner’s procedures
suggest how, at the earliest feasible moment, an arbitral tribunal could define
the neutral economic expert’s tasks and scope of participation in the various
stages of the proceedings.49 This kind of early delineation of the neutral
economic expert’s mandate would give substance and effect to the existing
arbitral rules that require the tribunal clearly to define the scope of the
questions upon which its neutral expert shall opine.50
Once appointed and instructed by the tribunal, the neutral economic expert
can devote himself to the analysis required to value damages. Many of the
economic questions that arise in international commercial arbitration or
investor-state arbitration have close analogues in other areas of public and
private law. In those analogous matters, economists routinely present expert
testimony that is far more intellectually rigorous than the mechanical
discounted cash flow (DCF) calculations typically found in accounting-based
testimony. In such matters, the neutral economic expert can particularly assist
the tribunal in answering questions about pricing—such as access pricing for
infrastructure or the pricing of long-term supply contracts with contingent
45 Instructions to Court-Appointed Damages Expert (Fed. R. Evid. 706) at 2, Northgate Techs., Inc. v.
Stryker Corp., No. 1:12-cv-07032 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2014).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., IBA RULES, supra note 22, art. 6(1); ICC PROPOSAL RULES, supra note 24, art. 6; ICC
REPORT, supra note 44, at 11; LCIA RULES, supra note 22, art. 21(1); UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 39, art.
29(1).
50 ICC REPORT, supra note 44, at 13, § 68 (emphasizing that a tribunal-appointed expert, as well as an
expert appointed jointly by the parties, should have a clear mandate).
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escalation or de-escalation provisions.51 In investor-state arbitration, the
neutral expert can evaluate damages for creeping expropriation or premature
termination of an exclusive concession, both of which are analogous in
economic terms to either regulatory takings or physical takings of private
property52 or the forced divestiture (or forced sharing) of private assets.53
Licensors and licensees of intellectual property are increasingly using
international commercial arbitration to resolve disputes over the global
licensing and valuation of intellectual property rights, including the
challenging question of how one defines fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms for the licensing of standard-essential
patents.54 The FRAND disputes involving smartphones and other
technologically dynamic products pose questions of first impression. A neutral
economic expert’s analysis of the testimony of opposing party experts would
materially assist the tribunal in answering those (and future) novel questions
with the level of economic rigor they require.
The cost of appointing a neutral economic expert would be small relative to
the current total cost of an arbitration.55 Although a neutral economic expert
51 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY
93–116 (1994) (explaining access pricing for telephone networks); J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITION TRANSFORMATION OF
NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (analyzing the legal and economic ramifications of
setting regulated prices for mandated access to telecommunications and energy networks). See generally
William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171
(1994) (explaining the economic theory of access pricing and the efficient-component pricing rule); Jerry A.
Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of
Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999) (explaining access pricing for telephone networks);
Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1185 (1999) (discussing
prices, terms, and conditions for access to essential facilities under antitrust law).
52 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 51, at 213–81 (explaining the economic determination of just
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for physical
invasions of property, confiscatory public utility rates, and regulatory takings of the private property of a
regulated firm). For a discussion of compensation for the inability of a regulated utility to recover its sunk
costs of infrastructure investment because subsequent changes in regulatory policy have truncated the utility’s
future revenue stream, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TRANSMISSION PRICING AND STRANDED
COSTS IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (AEI Press 1995); William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded
Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 835 (1995).
53 See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Andrew P. Vassallo, Did Separating Openreach from British Telecom
Benefit Consumers?, 38 WORLD COMPETITION 31, 31 (2015). See generally Howard A. Shelanski & J.
Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001).
54 See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
931, 932 (2013). See generally J. Gregory Sidak, Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for
Standard-Essential Patents, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014).
55 See, e.g., Albert Jan van den Berg, Note—Time and Costs: Issues and Initiatives from an Arbitrator’s
Perspective, 28 ICSID REV. 218, 218 (2013) (recognizing the concern raised by arbitration practitioners and
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might need to conduct some original research, a tribunal presumably would
instruct him primarily to analyze the parties’ opposing claims and damages
estimates. The required time and cost of producing a neutral economic expert
report should be lower than that of a party expert report, which must establish a
framework and cover all foundational material for the tribunal.56 In addition, if
the tribunal were to instruct the neutral economic expert to advise on a
circumscribed set of specific issues,57 the defined mandate of the neutral
economic expert report would further limit the costs to the parties.
I draw my insights on the cost effectiveness of neutral economic experts
from my experience as Judge Posner’s neutral expert in the Brandeis and
Northgate patent cases. In both cases, I was appointed early enough that I was
able to submit my report before Judge Posner considered the parties’ Daubert
motions. After litigating for two-and-a-half years, the plaintiff and one of the
two remaining defendants in Brandeis settled two weeks after the Daubert
hearing and one month after I had filed my report. The second remaining
defendant filed for dismissal several weeks thereafter. The parties settled so
quickly in Brandeis that they postponed my deposition indefinitely. In
Northgate, the case concluded with even greater speed. I filed my report two
weeks after my appointment58 and was deposed the next week. The parties
notified Judge Posner the following week to report that they had settled, on the
eve of the Daubert hearing.
One possible concern about using a neutral economic expert in arbitration
is that the expert might so influence the tribunal’s determination as to become
the de facto “fourth arbitrator.” However, that possibility seems unlikely.
Arbitration rules bar the tribunal from delegating the determination of an
award to any third party, including an expert.59 The rules also prohibit the
neutral expert from opining on matters outside the expert’s mandate and scope

clients that arbitral proceedings are too lengthy and too costly, and suggesting initiatives for time and cost
savings); Park, Arbitrators and Accuracy, supra note 28, at 29.
56 Sidak, Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts, supra note 4, at 388.
57 See, e.g., ICC PROPOSAL RULES, supra note 24, art. 1(2)(c) (stating that the Request for Proposal of an
expert must include “a detailed description of the work to be carried out by the expert, including whether an
expert report or site visits will be required”); LCIA RULES, supra note 22, art. 21(1).
58 Report on Patent Damages of Court-Appointed Damages Expert (Fed. R. Evid. 706(b)), J. Gregory
Sidak, Northgate Techs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:12-cv-07032 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2014) (subject to
protective order) (on file with author).
59 See, e.g., Sachs & Schmidt-Ahrendts, supra note 37, at 139; Dave, supra note 22, at 157.
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of professional qualifications.60 A violation of those rules would, in the
immediate term, prompt the parties to request a replacement of the neutral
expert in an arbitral proceeding and, over the longer term, tarnish the
reputation of an arbitrator or neutral expert.
One experienced arbitrator has told me that he has considered appointing a
neutral expert but has not done so because of the concern that he might later
feel compelled to depart or dissent from the neutral expert’s conclusions. The
arbitrator’s concern was that the pressure to accept the expert’s opinion would
cause him (as arbitrator) to relinquish control over an important part of the
decision. Then, the arbitrator worried, he would face the parties’ complaints
that they had been made to pay for an expert whom they did not select and
whose conclusions the tribunal ultimately rejected.
At least two factors will limit the severity of this problem in practice. First,
if the independent expert is an experienced expert witness in arbitration and
litigation, the expert will care about the reputational harm of delivering an
opinion so unhelpful or incorrect that the tribunal feels compelled to regard it.
Second, the likelihood that the tribunal will feel compelled to disregard the
opinion of its neutral expert is a function of the scope of the instructions that
the tribunal gives the neutral expert. For example, the instruction that the
neutral economic expert shall render an independent opinion on the “correct”
measure of quantum is more subject to controversy than is the instruction that
the neutral expert shall opine on which party expert’s report on quantum is the
more credible. Even less subject to controversy is an instruction of the sort that
Judge Posner gives: that the neutral economic expert shall render “advice on
whether the opinions formed by the parties’ damages experts are the result of
responsible research and analysis.”61
V. CONCLUSION
A tribunal’s determination of quantum is an inherently economic task. In a
complex commercial dispute, an arbitrator with expertise in economics or a
neutral economic expert can increase the intellectual rigor of the analyses
conducted by the party experts and thereby expedite the proceeding. The
60 See, e.g., IBA RULES, supra note 22, art. 6(1); ICC ADMINISTRATION RULES, supra note 24, art. 6; ICC
REPORT, supra note 44, at 13, § 68; LCIA RULES, supra note 22, art. 21(1); UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 39,
art. 29(1).
61 Instructions to Court-Appointed Damages Expert at 1, Brandeis Univ. v. East Side Ovens Inc., No.
1:12-cv-01508 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2012).
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magnitude of quantum will more closely reflect the proper amount of
compensable harm, which will strengthen the perception that the tribunal had
issued an award that is fair, reasoned, and legitimate.

